Chapter 3 - CHOREOTECHNICS

This chapter's three sections will essay a conception of choreography under the light of Simondon's philosophy. More specifically, the notions of choreographic system, choreographic knowledge and choreographic object will be explored in accordance with the abstractions, transductions and expressions of individuation. First, the potentials of choreography will be tackled from the perspective of dance's relationship with writing. Such relationship will be conceived as being problematic and, precisely because of this, potential with regard to the individuation of novel instances of choreographic knowledge. Moreover, the resolution of such problematic potentials will be defined in terms of a continuous differentiation of serial parts that, inasmuch as the latter regard movement-events, expresses choreography as such. Second, the choreographic object will be defined after the argument that choreography can exist without dance. Such argument allows not only for thinking choreography in abstraction, but also for defining the choreographic object as a diagrammatic structure of potentials, from which many different expressions can result. By defining the choreographic object is this way, it will be emphasized that, rather than this being an ideal form, it is a system of potential transductions most apt to elicit the transindividuation of subjective and objective perspectives upon one same epistemological relation. Third, the notion of choreographic object will be further explored by analyzing a paradigmatic example of how choreography can be expressed by means other than dance. By looking into William Forsythe's collection of choreographic objects "*Improvisation Technologies*", it will be argued that the choreographic object is characteristically topological and, as such, capable of expressing the same diagram of potentials, not only in different ways but also, and more importantly, in different domains of expression. From this, the choreographic object's topological character will be explored together with notions of memory and rhythm. It will be argued that only by means of conceiving memory both in terms of perception and forgetting can the choreographic object's topological potentials be understood to be creative. Additionally, it will be argued that neither abstraction nor expression suffice to define choreography. Their affective becoming needs to be considered as an irreducible whole, most fundamentally defined by rhythmic ideas of movement.

3.1 - Choreography's Excess

After the previous incursion into Simondon's theory of individuation, we are now better equipped to tackle the question previously posed with regard to the conditions of technogenesis in the encounter between dance and technology. To say that an encounter is defined by the event of novelty, by the concretization of a creative potential present in a process's initial conditions, is to say that novelty itself cannot result but from an encounter. In this sense, encounter and novelty can be conflated into the kind of event whereby a system's disparities are resolved into unpredictable facts. A truly creative process will at some point of its development allow for an encounter's perspective, for a perspective corresponding to the multiplicity of concrescent parts conditioning the emergence of novelty. But this perspective does not correspond only to the multiplicity of given parts. Inasmuch as this multiplicity is immanent in the multiplicity of what is not given, the encounter's perspective corresponds as well to the qualitative field of undetermined potentials from which novelty necessarily results. As such, the actual-virtual dynamisms of process already mentioned to be a fundamental force of creativity can be understood as being characteristic of an encounter, for what results from a principle of immanence active in a creative process is precisely the relation between forces and forms necessary to the resolution of a system's problems. The principle of immanence is the principle of an encounter. It supposes the relation between parts that are simultaneously given and not given and that therefore are potentially problematic in regard to the overall development of the system to which they belong. From this standpoint, the conditions of technogenesis in the encounter between dance and technology can be said to include the principle of immanence defining any creative process whatsoever. Only by reason of the virtual-actual dynamisms active in individuation can the encounter between dance and technology be said to be so, that is, to be considered as a truly creative process. Such potentials of creativity are none other than the ones of its excessive reality, i.e. its more-than-individual reality. From which it follows that, despite the possible constraints given by what is determinate at any point of a system's technical development, what the singular encounters between dance and technology share, beyond possibility, is the fact that they emerge from a network of relations where information mobilizes the becoming of technics. Independently of how the actuality of these networks conditions informational exchange, what in the end attests the event of the encounter between dance and technology is the very fact of novelty, the fact that the emergent encounter is singular in that it results from irreducible

resolutions.

Amidst the general becoming of technics, and alongside its many different expressions, the encounter between dance and technology must be defined by means with a proper character. The question is: which kind of networks are proper to this species of encounter? Or, in other words, what is its characteristic technicity? The answer resides in what has been, from its first manifestations to the present, a prevalent mode of individuation in the history of encounters between dance and technology, namely, choreography. From the outset, choreography has established a relation between dance and writing: Thoinot Arbeaus's "Orchesography" (1925), choreography's first treatise, founded the writing of dance in the European Renaissance as a technology of transmission and regulation; from this moment onwards, the organization of gestures and bodies in time and space had no longer to be passed directly from a dance master to his students, but could be learnt at a distance, via writing. About this fundamental project, dance scholar André Lepecki comments that it was established on the basis of a "semiotic symmetry between writing and dancing that guarantees the unproblematic traffic from one to the other" (2004, p. 126). This equation, between dancing and writing, served to further establish conventional codes, such as Feuillet's notation (1701), the use of which facilitated choreographers' hermeneutic authority over the dances. In this sense, what might have been first a drive to not forget and remember the dances, led to an "apparatus of capture" that mostly served their regulation. "To conceive choreography as an apparatus", says Lepecki, "is to see it as a mechanism that simultaneously distributes and organizes dance's relationship to perception and signification. For it is precisely this kind of organization of the perceptive-linguistic field that apparatuses perform" (2007, p. 120). But the incapacity of writing to transmit the essential traits of dance was a preoccupation that soon became manifest, most notably with dance master Jean-Georges Noverre. Identifying this transition, Lepecki further writes: "[...] from a perception of dance as unproblematically translatable from code to steps, and from steps back to code again (a peacefully symmetry between inscription and dancing that characterizes […] Arbeau's and Feuillet's perception), we arrive, with Noverre, to an understanding of dance as elusive presence, dance as the fleeting trace of an always irretrievable, never fully translatable motion: neither into notation, nor into writing." (22004, p. 127). Which is an argument that came to define a longstanding tradition in claiming that performance is fundamentally irreducible and irretrievable; a tradition that has had as prominent advocates figures as influent as Antonin Artaud (Derrida, 1978), Richard Schechner (2011, p. 50) and Peggy Phelan

(1993, p. 146). This is the argument that performance is defined as that which comes into presence—a unitary, self-identical, and non-linguistic presence conveying that which nothing but performance itself can convey. In this sense, and in spite of possible recursions of the live event, immediate presence is taken to be that which holds the truth-value of performance, for only through performance can there take place an irreducible experience that cannot be mediated otherwise. Reinforcing the irreducibility of performance is the argument that the event of presence in performance is a fleeting one, vanishing at the very moment of its appearance. Performance, as such, is irretrievable, for it is impossible to retain it without loosing its fundamental character, that of being always transient.

But performance does recur. It creates correspondences between different modes of expression, from performative events to writing and back. Considering this fact, expressed by the variety of ways in which performance can be acted, written and remembered, performance art theorist Adrian Heathfield writes that "[...] one of performance's most consistent and recurring conditions is transformation" (2012, p. 32). Across its multiple instances of experience, the recurrence of performance enacts its transformation. It moves from one event to another through writing, and from one writing to another through all kinds of events, forming a system of assertion that, rather than attributing any kind of essential authenticity to its different expressions, is fundamentally defined by its transformative capacities. As a system of assertion, performance is capable of conveying both the immediacy of its events and the mediation of its written inscriptions. In either case, the experience of performance occurs. With writing, the knowledge conveyed by the transient events of performance can be reactivated, notwithstanding the fact that this passage, which implicates remembrance, necessarily leads to novel experiences. By the same token, which regards the potentials of the overall system of assertion comprising performance and writing, the experiences of writing can lead to new experiences in performance. As an example of this encompassing capacity of performance to recur repeatedly, but not without difference, one can think of "*Le Sacre du Printemps*". This well known piece, first choreographed and performed in 1913 by Vaslav Nijinsky for Sergei Diaghilev's Les Ballets Russes, accompanied by the also well known musical score by Igor Stravinski, has been to the present date one of the most reenacted and recurrent pieces in the history of theatrical production.[73] Despite the controversy provoked by its presentation in Paris

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73 For a list of reenactments of "*Le Sacre du Printemps*", see "*Stravinsky: The Global Dancer: A Chronology of Choreography to the Music of Igor Stravinsky*", in http://ws1.roehampton.ac.uk/stravi

of that time, it is symptomatic that 2013 was the year in which a wide range of expressions took place, commemorating the work's centenary and showing its influence to this date. Today, not only all sorts of artistic reformulations and reinterpretations of "*Le Sacre du Printemps*" can be seen, from video works to performances and festivals dedicated to it (many due to the fact of its everlasting influent and still today actual soundtrack), but also discursive embeddings of the work can be found allover, notably in the theoretical production of disciplines such as performance and dance studies. "*Le Sacre du Printemps*" can be seen as one big system of performance, encompassing all of its variable expressions and potentials of transformation.

In the whole field of performance, choreography attests the systemic relation between possible modes of expression, for the relationship between writing and dancing is paradigmatic of the causality that performance's various recurrences can establish among themselves. The causation of a system of performance where relationships between writing and dancing are determinate is nonetheless not complete, given in its logics, but rather a process open both to what cannot be predicted and to what cannot be known subsequently (because imperceptible and unconscious). An openness that should be understood neither in opposition to the choreographic regulation of dances nor in opposition to the idea of performance's irreducible character, but rather as encompassing both. Positing choreography as an open system of performance, where all sorts of expressions can take place, stands for acknowledging difference as an operative dimension of process, constitutive of a system's overall development. As such, it is present both in writing and in dancing, and also in the operations whereby one gives place to the other. The differences between choreography's modes of expression are the motor of its individuation. Only by means of ingressing problems, to be resolved in the transition from one expression to another, can the creative powers of this system of assertion be activated and allow for transformations where the referent remains the same, but not without being differently expressed.

With all its creative capacities, choreography corresponds in a very precise way to what French philosopher Michel Foucault has defined as "archive". For the author, the archive is that which "reveals the rules of a practise that enables statements both to survive and to undergo regular modification. [The archive] is the general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (2007, p. 102). In this sense, the ontological predicate according to which performance is irreducible and irretrievable

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must give way to the ontogenetic depiction of choreography's overall development as a system of assertion. Which is not to say that the event of performance does not possess a singular and irretrievable character, but rather to affirm that this uniqueness partakes in a larger context of enunciation that also conditions its transformed recursions. As archive, choreography can be said to be a system of assertion that most fundamentally regards ideas of movement. Between a field of potentials and a series of assertions, what forms and transforms in the archive of choreography are problems and resolutions of movement. Choreography's capacity for expressing movement ideas in different ways attests its excessive reality, i.e. it attests the fact that it is itself a system of individuation including both a preindividual reality and an individual order of assertion. The very asymmetry between dancing and writing corresponds to the problems that determinate ideas of movement posit to the system to which they belong in the process of their own assertion. When asserted in several instances, the same idea can differ from itself by creating problems to the choreographic system. Once again, it should be acknowledged that what intensifies the becoming of a choreographic system is the dynamic interplay between the virtual and the actual, i.e. the interplay between an idea of movement and the actual constraints exerted upon its own assertion. The asymmetry of choreography's expressions, rather than revealing the incompleteness of each of them relatively to one another, simply manifests the system's transformative capacities. With each individuation, choreography expresses differently the problematic reality of its own ideas. Writing and dancing do not complete one another for the expression of one choreographic totality, but rather correspond to the expression of ideas that, moving through different conditions, express each time anew the ground from which they stem.

The argument that writing supplements the event is in this way converted into a productive relation between the two. The asymmetry between writing and dancing corresponds precisely to choreography's capacity for activating potentials, resolving itself into the emergence of yet another actual expression. Even Jacques Derrida's deconstructions accord to this in their own way: having extensively dwelt upon the conception that writing supplements the event, compensating its irretrievability, Derrida has shown how in fact the "supplement" is "undecided [between] accretion and substitution"; it is "not a signified more than a signifier, a representer than a presence, a writing than a speech" (1976, p. 315). This undecidability of writing marks the fact that what recurs with its assertion can both supplement its referent, and thus remain indexed by it, and substitute it with its own autonomy, as a generative regime of signs. Writing can both depend on the contexts of its inscription and be an autopoietic system. Beyond

the supplementary logic that writing may be said to commit to, adding to the event, writing is also capable of generating reality by its own means. Regarding its autonomy, Derrida further says that "[f]or a writing to be a writing it must continue to 'act' and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written 'in his name'." (1982, p. 307). An argument that, at once, invokes the fact that the intentions of a writer aren't assured to be accessed via the written, and that the written can in fact act on its own, away from hermeneutic regulations. In the cases where dances are transmitted via writing, not only characteristic of the Renaissance but also of such massive projects as the development of Labanotation throughout the twentieth century, or even of more recent projects such as those discussed throughout in this study, this autonomy of writing attests the fact that, regarding the overall system of assertion that it partakes, writing stands on its own feet as the choreographic expression of movement ideas. Hence, writing doesn't require supplements of any sort. It is fully capable of expressing movement ideas. A corollary that, in relation to the ontological definition of performance as transient and irreducible, posits as well the singular capacities of other modes of expression. If performance conserves an irretrievable character, then writing itself is capable of conveying that which only writing can convey. Both dancing and writing are fully capable of problematizing and resolving ideas of movement.

In what regards choreography, writing should be understood not only as the inscription of graphemes characteristic of notation, but as a more encompassing creation of invariant functions, that is, as the creation of what does not vary throughout one same choreography's different expressions. The structures shared both by choreographic notation and by the performance of dance, inasmuch as they don't vary, can be said to correspond to one same written choreography. Choreography is in this way equated with the formation of recursive structures, which makes of the writing of dance the choreotechnical formation of stable memories. With them, choreographic ideas can be transposed from one individuation the next, to be possibly resolved only by means of an interplay between the given and the ungiven. Such interplay corresponds to the affective reality of memory in processes of choreographic individuation. Memory acts both virtually and actually towards the resolution of problematic ideas of movement. When, for example, a group of dancers performs, once again, a choreography that they have

been performing repeatedly for some time, what necessarily takes place is a resolution of the problems posed by the emergent relation between what is actuality given (e.g. the muscular memory, or patterned habit, of each dancing body) and what is not (i.e. the indetermination implied in recollecting what had not been remembered until that very moment). Despite the fact that each performance necessarily corresponds to the singular resolution of problems, what is transposed from one event to the next is precisely this problematic potential of choreographic memory, as it persists in each dancing body.

The invariant functions of choreography are not the substances of its identity. To say that a system of choreographic individuation does not vary throughout its development and across its expressions corresponds to saying that a principle of individuation is transduced throughout the multiple modulations of the system's potentials. To ask what is a choreographic principle of individuation is to ask "what is a choreography?", a question to which Portuguese philosopher José Gil answers with: "it is a nexus of movements" (2001, p. 81, *my translation*). With this answer, the author already acknowledges that movement is double. On the one hand, movement is virtual and contributory, ingressing into actuality and traversing all occasions of experience (what the author calls "whole movement"). On the other hand, it corresponds to the actual expressions of the ongoing transformation of states. Understanding choreography as a nexus of movements is to acknowledge the dynamic interplay between the virtual and the actual. In this way, choreography is understood as comprising simultaneously the movements of thought initiated by a problematic idea and the expressive movements of the latter's resolution. Furthermore, for Gil, a nexus "is dictated neither by its expressivity nor by its finality" (Ibid). Rather a nexus is said to result from the combination of series that, notwithstanding the fact of being divergent, are continuous to one another. This is no paradox, for their continuity is the continuity of their differences. Only by means of relating continuously to one another, can divergent series intensify their differences. From which it follows that a nexus can be defined as the rhythmic intensification of differences between series that, in this way, become continuous to one another as the multiple parts of one whole. According to Gil, "[t]he rhythm assures the distances [between the series] in continuity, allowing for an uninterrupted movement of differentiation that modulates time [...] and the internal distance to the intervals" (Ibid., pp. 86–87, *my translation*). This can be understood by simply considering a dancing body and the movement of its musculoskeletal regions. For example, the movement of one foot and the movement of one hand involve different regions of the musculoskeletal system. While moving simultaneously, the different

series of each movement region form a rhythm by continuously intensifying their differences. The differential intensification of the series actually defines each of them in the continuous relation to the other. This is the nexus of their choreography, be the dance a more or less determinate one.[74] The nexus, rather than being given, is emergent. From which one possible conclusion can be drawn: the choreographic nexus is not given and emerges with each choreographic process that it comes to define because of being relative to the absolute event of its own appearance.[75] What is transduced throughout a choreographic system's development is the relativity of its nexus' formal structure to its own "absolute origin". This allows for one same principle of individuation to resume itself across different events of expression. Hence, the invariant function of choreography, which is its principle of individuation, corresponds to the event of rhythm, which is the recurrent intensification of differences between the series of a multiplicity. Choreography is the nexus that forms when the series of movement-events intensify their differences to the point of becoming continuous to one another and, by these means, constituting a whole.

From this standpoint, it can be said that the technicity of the encounter between dance and technology regards most fundamentally the rhythm of individuation of movement ideas. Which is also to say that choreography's associated milieu, its technical network, is informed with the resolution of the problems posed by such ideas to the dedicated domains of individuation. And if the principle of choreographic individuation corresponds to a nexus' relativity to its own "absolute origin", then this relativity must be related to what lies at the heart of an incompatibility between potentials, notably the disparity of a movement idea. This disparity can be thought as pertaining to the problems posed to a process when in face of its actual conditions. A movement idea is never exactly the same as its possible expressions because, in individuation, undetermined potentials persist in exerting their force upon what is given. Despite the margins of indetermination built into a system, movement ideas will always bear a difference in regard to the possibilities of their own expression. Besides, this disparity can be thought as pertaining to the fact that, without actuality, an idea cannot acquire a resolute definition. Its abstract reality is fundamentally indefinite and therefore

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74 For Gil (2001, p. 81), the requirements of a choreographic nexus are as strong in improvised dances as in choreographed ones, a demand that attests how much choreographic individuation involves a multiplicity of processes and structures (i.e. a whole of which the choreographic nexus is only one part), each of them with its proper nexus.

75 Much in the same way as the "seed of form" of individuation is not given but nonetheless determines the tropisms of the individuating system where it comes to occur. For more on this subject see pages 61-63.

assures its openness to the potentials of the system to which it belongs,. Only by means of this relation can a movement idea be not only relative to its different modes of expression but also relative to the absolute potential of its own appearance. It is disparate in relation to itself because it mediates between the virtual and the actual the rhythm of its own choreographic nexus. And if, as Adrian Mackenzie tells us, "[t]o think transductively is to mediate between different orders, to place heterogeneous realities in contact, and to become something different" (2002, p. 18), then the nexus of the encounter between dance and technology is that which results from this very mediation. Choreography can thus be said to correspond to a transductive mode of thought that differentiates its movement ideas according to a rhythm of individuation: it differentiates them in relation to themselves with the disparition of the problematic conditions of their own appearance; and it differentiates them and in relation to the progressive structuration of potentials, by means of which multiple series simultaneously diverge and intensify their differences. In sum, the technicity of choreography corresponds to the rhythm with which a network of movement ideas is (in)formed, to the point of expressing a determinate nexus.

3.2 - The Choreographic Object

In face of choreography's transformative capacities, choreographer William Forsythe calls forth the opening of its definition: "To reduce choreography to a single definition is not to understand the most crucial of its mechanisms: to resist and reform previous conceptions of its definition" (2008, pp. 5–6). As mentioned before, these "mechanisms" exist not only where different expressions do in fact resist and reform one another, but also where the potentials of choreography reside. It is only because of such potentials that choreography can express itself in this or that novel way. Its renewal depends on this implicit capacity. And when expressed otherwise, choreography can be the subject of an individuation that does not even require dancing bodies. As such, it is possible to look for choreography elsewhere than in the performance of dance. It is also from this standpoint that Forsythe has proffered the disjunction of dance and choreography: "Choreography and dancing are two distinct and very different practices" (Ibid.). Which corresponds both to the fact that dance can occur without a choreographic nexus and that a choreographic nexus can be expressed by forms other than dance. Following from this capacity, Forsythe came to define the choreographic

object as "a model of potential transition from one state to another in any space imaginable" (Ibid.). A definition which accords with the theory of individuation expounded before insofar as the model in it included corresponds to the diagram of choreographic individuation. As already mentioned,[76] such diagram is virtual as long as its potentials are kept apart from concrete individuals. But when mobilized, these are potentials that tend to be expressed as network: the diagram becomes concrete as a network of technical objects, of which the choreographic one is a keypoint. Despite its possible expressions, the choreographic diagram is always abstract and more-than-individual. In abstraction, it verges towards possibility, creating tendencies in an otherwise flat field of potentials. This is an asymmetric distribution of possibilities, of which only particular nexuses can result.[77] Hence, to each choreographic object corresponds a diagram of forces and a rhythm of individuation.

The choreographic diagram is closer to Felix Guattari's notion of "metamodel" (2012) than to the notion of model as understood by structuralism and cybernetics. Though Guattari's notion has been engendered in reaction to prevailing modes of analysis in fields such as psychology (i.e. Jacques Lacan), anthropology (i.e. Claude Levi-Strauss) and philosophy (i.e. Louis Althusser), to name a few, it draws its predicaments from several other influences, such as linguistics, semiotics, cybernetics, information theory, systems theory, ethology, thermodynamics and mathematics (Watson, 2011, pp. 1–14). A multiplicity of sources that grants it with the capacity to adapt itself to any field of inquiry. As Guattari himself states, a metamodel pertains "[n]ot to a general model, but to an instrument for deciphering modelling systems in diverse domains [...]" (2012, p. 17). More importantly, the author writes elsewhere, "[w]hat distinguishes metamodelization from modelization is the way it uses terms to develop possible openings onto the virtual and onto creative processuality" (1995, p. 31). The metamodel is a general potential of creativity that, while addressing the problems posed by the realization of models, proceeds by forging "new coordinates for reading and to 'bring into existence' new representations and propositions" (2012, p. 17). If a technical object can in any way be approached as model, it is only because it has become one. Conversely, before becoming, such model exists only in potential.[78] The choreographic diagram must therefore be understood as that which opens the object

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76 See Simondon's notion of technicity on pages 84-87.
77 For a discussion on how the diagram acts in processes of individuation, see Section 4.3.
78 The topic of general potentiality will be addressed at length when discussing its distinction with the notion of relative potentials in Alfred N. Whitehead's theory of the "extensive continuum". See page 223.

onto the virtual. It opens it onto potentials that, though not choreographic *per se,* assure the object's capacity to express a determinate nexus of movements.

The choreographic object's processual character, as defined above, corresponds as well to its transductive character. Its potential transitions between states, in any space imaginable, regard the modulation of forces performed by its diagram. Individuation proceeds, but not without being subjected to tendencies implied by the latter. What moves with choreographic transduction is less a form than a principle of individuation. In the brief essay where Forsythe defines the choreographic object, as just quoted, instead of providing examples of it, the choreographer invokes the musical score, which for him is an object of the same kind. The musical score, as it is known, holds the necessary potentials for transducing the organization of musical ideas into the actual performance of music. Or, better yet, the potentials for such transduction exist within the system of assertion to which the musical score belongs, for these are potentials related with the representation that the signs in the score can elicit in a signifying agent. This process attests both the incompleteness of each expression relatively to the whole and the latter's capacity for existing in between forms, that is, the object's capacity to conserve its diagrammatic potential throughout the incorporeal phases of each transduction. The simple fact that music can be memorized and remembered, without any need for mnemonic artifacts such as scores, attests that it is as well open onto the virtual. As much as the musical object is finalized neither by scores nor by performances, its definition must comprise the diagram of its own ideas. Only by means of a diagrammatic arrangement of potentials can musical transductions be understood. From performance into score and from score into performance, one same object can only be iterated as long as its diagram persists across transitions.

All of this applies equally to choreographic objects. While understanding that a musical score "represents the potential of perceptual phenomena to instigate action, the result of which can be perceived by a sense of a different order: a transition via the body from the visual to the aural", Forsythe understands as well that a "choreographic object, or score, is by nature open to a full palette of phenomenological instigations because it acknowledges the body as wholly designed to persistently read every signal from its environment." (2008, pp. 5–6). There is therefore a degree of indetermination to the choreographic object that is larger than the one of the musical object. The lesser degree of the musical object is given by the conventional bias that its transductions must necessarily engage, at some point, the aural domain. In turn, choreography's larger degree of indetermination regards the fact that the body is capable of transducing any

signal whatsoever into different domains of expression. In this sense, it is more likely for a musical object to be perceived as being as well choreographic than the opposite. Insofar as music conveys movements with nexus, it can be read as choreographic. To say that choreographic transductions occur between "any space imaginable" not only stands for acknowledging the body's capacity to perceive movements with nexus out of, virtually, anything, but also for acknowledging its capacity to transduce such nexus into other domains of individuation.

The potentials of choreography are deeply rooted in the transductive capacities of the body. Such capacities, which rely on the body's "wholly design to persistently read every signal from its environment", pertain most evidently to the ongoing resolutions of perception and affection. According to the preindividual of individuation, there is here a level of indistinction between the senses because perception is yet to be determined. The choreographic object addresses such indetermination. It addresses sense-making in its processual unfolding, which does not occur without a confusion of senses yet to be determined. It acknowledges the body as an open system and uses its capacity to "persistently read every signal from its environment" to attribute nexus to any possible conjunction of perceptions. Besides Simondon's understanding of the role of the preindividual in perception and thought, the undifferentiated resonance of the senses can be thought together with the notion of synaesthesia. A concept traceable back to Stoic philosophy, synaesthesia (*sunaisthêsis)* can be understood as a "joint-sense" (Elo, 2012, p. 4), as a capacity of the senses to "feel-with" one another (Heller-Roazen, 2007, p. 108). This capacity gives place to what the body senses by means of what it doesn't. It is a process that, before resolving itself into the perceptual differentiation of senses, proceeds unresolved. The case of synaesthesia posits that the emergence of sense does not occur without a process that is without mode. Before becoming modally disjunct (e.g. hearing, seeing, touching, tasting and smelling), sense is amodal. It belongs to the unresolved of bodily processes where the incorporeal relates to the excessive regime of affects. Amodal sense-affectivity is part of the unconscious process of being in/with the world. Accordingly, synaesthesia can be thought as the self-affectivity through which the body folds over itself, imbricating into one another events yet to be associated with this or that specific sense. Even after having individuated, each sense does not cease to be embedded in such activity. It is not possible to consider each mode of sense-perception without considering as well the regime of affects on which it depends. Hearing, for example, does not take place as it does without a related body-schema, which is partially constituted by proprioceptive, vestibular and kinaesthetic

orientations (Lingis, 1993). Any sufficiently strong change in the latter will inevitably change the former, such when the subject experiences the absence of echo (in an anechoic chamber), only to notice how much its own proprioception depends on the perception of sound. To a large extent, the synaesthetic resonance of the senses can only be felt in effect. In the case of heightened synaesthesia, for example, perception informs the subject of ongoing affects between that which, from a habitual perspective, might be said to be disjunct, but which from the eventful disruption of the associative habit indisputably reveals itself as associate and in some way dependent, even if the logic of such dependence remains unknown, because inaccessible (Campen, 2010).

From this standpoint, it matters to acknowledge that choreographic objects cannot be associated with any one specific modality of sense. Rather, they must be defined in terms of processes that convey ideas independently from domains of expression, as these may be associated with specific modes of sense-perception. What pertains more precisely to the definition of such objects is their potential to elicit thoughts that, in retrospective, might be said to be choreographic. This, of course, depends on the context of assertion where each thought takes place. As already mentioned when quoting philosopher Muriel Combes,[79] each psychic individuation intricately depends on the collective milieu of ideas from which it stems and where it finds its conceptual value. A choreographic thought can only be said to be so because of a context where other choreographic abstractions are collectively transduced and in relation to which it concurs, with variable degrees of contrast. The choreographic object exists upon this relation. It persists as a principle of individuation with the potential to relate emerging thoughts with a co-individuating milieu of choreographic abstractions. A relation which depends on transductions where the conceptual seed of choreography must be potentially present. Together with the expression of a choreographic nexus, it must also be transduced the potential for it to be thought and recognized as such.

The independence of choreographic thinking from specific domains of expression runs in parallel to its reliance upon the body's capacities of abstraction. But such capacities necessarily depend from its actual experiences. Which means that there is at the heart of thought an implication of processes, making of concepts a resolution that does not go without the synaesthetic resonance of sense-making. In other words, the sense of thought emerges itself from the senses' indistinct junction, as any other modality of sense (Aristotle, 1931, p. 421a; Heller-Roazen, 2007, pp. 291–300). Not

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79 See page 74.

only does this comply with the immanence of abstraction in expression, but more specifically with the immanence of choreographic thoughts in a relationship between individual and milieu, where the resolution of problems in perception corresponds to the individuation of movements with nexus. And how could it not be so, if for there to be a correspondence between thought and nexus both must individuate from one same preindividual reality. They both follow from the transductive analogy of their own processes. An analogy which accords with Simondon's argument that knowledge does not follow from an inexplicable relation between subjects and objects given by "*a priori* forms of sensibility", but rather from their co-individuation "from the same primitive reality".[80] To equate choreographic principles with "models of potential transition" regards not only the fact that any relation between subjects and objects has its proper nexus, but also the fact that any principle of individuation can only be understood together with what it gives birth to. Once more, this is the case of the nexus' relativity to its own absolute origin.[81] The case that choreographic principles are not given in advance to the individuations that they come to energize and structure, but that they are defined only with the process of individuation itself. A choreographic principle is the choreographic nexus that comes to be known, it is the diagrammatic arrangement of forces implicit in the thoughts that from them might result.

It should nonetheless be made clear that, because of its technical character, the choreographic object relies upon the application of technical acts. Only by becoming a keypoint in a technical network can the choreographic object transduce its potentials and become known as such. In contrast to other technical acts, the choreographic one can be defined by its potentials for eliciting synaesthetic resonances. Only by these means can thoughts which are truly choreographic acquire some resolute determination. And due to the analogies of transductive knowledge, what will have become a choreographic thought must necessarily regard actual forms of informational exchange defining the relative nexus of movements. The choreographic object is known as such only within the limits defined by its margins of indetermination, which are determined by the act itself. The choreographic act modulates the ingression of undetermined potentials into processes of individuation by determining parameters that will define each object's choreographic nexus. The readership of choreographic notation makes a good case for what is a technical act, in the choreographic sense. Once a choreographic object has been notated, it can only elicit transductions if the body coincides with a

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80 See page 73.
81 See pages 96-98.

signifying agent, i.e. if the subject is constituted on the basis of a capacity to read notations according to a particular nexus. Choreographic readership is a capacity which focuses the "wholly design [of the body] to persistently read every signal from its environment" towards the justification of what it reads as a nexus of movements. It allows for the body to access choreographic rhythms of intensification and differentiation, in a continuous relation between signifying series. Such continuity is assured by the act of reading itself. Reading transduces the choreographic principles implied in written parameters and allows for modulating processes with determinate margins of indetermination.

While setting margins of indetermination for individuating systems, technical acts constrain informational exchanges and define the resulting networks. To say that the choreographic object is a "model of potential transition" stands for saying that, as model, it constrains the rhythmic differentiation of a multiplicity of series with determinate parameters. This is the expression of its technicity. A standpoint implying that a parameter is a relation between variables and that each choreographic parameter is defined by margins of indetermination that assure its very continuity. The parametric constraining of choreography determines the continuity of its nexus and allows for it to be recognized as such. In other words, an object will only be recognized as being choreographic on the condition that its individuation differentiates series of sense-events at the same time that it constrains their relation in continuity. Individuating choreographies at once differentiate series of sense-events, assure their differential relation in continuity and allow for co-individuating movements of thought.

3.3 - Topological Continuity, Differential Expressivity

When accounting for the choreographic object's features, for the fact that it is capable of eliciting technical action, for the fact that it does so with an emphasis on synaesthesia, and for the fact that synaesthetic indetermination is limited by a set of parametric constraints, its expression in domains other than the dancing body becomes somewhat problematic. After all, if all these aspects are to be attained, it is necessary that the choreographic object is expressed in ways that are worthy of the body's complexity. Despite Forsythe's assertion that "[c]horeography and dancing are two distinct and very different practices" (2008, pp. 5–6), in most cases they still remain bound to each other. Even if they are taken to be autonomous practices, it is via their

relationship that the powers and limitations of the one are transferred to the other. When dancing is put in relation with choreography, the latter's expressions must necessarily comply with the dancing body's potentials. As such, to express choreography in domains other than the dancing body while keeping it as referent, i.e. as a possible receptacle of choreographic transductions, stands for solving the problem of how to individuate expressions as potential as the dancing body itself.

This is a problem well known to dance notators. As much as the dancing body implies a variety of infinities, the notation of dance is primarily defined by an exclusive selection of data. Already in 1930, choreographer Fritz Klingenbeck wrote: "The dance notator must, along with a trained eye for the rapid perception of movement events, possess above all an understanding of the actual elements of the dance movement. In this consideration three factors stand out as particularly important, which the dance notator must be able to keep apart reliably. First, the actual composition, the naked, clear structure of the dance, second, the performance, the personal interpretation of the artist, and third, there are in most cases the factors determining style. It may not be entirely simple to draw the boundaries between these three factors, especially between the first two, the composition and the interpretation. […] Thousands of small movements, phrasings, head, feet, are mainly idiosyncrasies of the performing artist, for whom it would be absurd to prescribe something else. Thus, there falls on the dance writer the same difficult and responsible task, namely to strip away all these secondary manifestations from his notation score and to leave them out of consideration. To recognise what must be written down, and what not, is not entirely easy, because the boundaries are always fluid and in most cases it is exactly the secondary manifestations belonging to the interpretation, which can make a dance interesting and valuable. Nevertheless, composition and interpretation must be clearly separated from each other by the dance notator, if another artist is to be able to recreate thereafter." (1990). More recently, dance notator Marion Bastien also wrote: "When I was notating with some maturity [...], I was often thinking that my expertise was not based on how many details I could write down in the score, but on what I was able to throw away. My greatest expertise was the ability to filter, to select." (2007, p. 51). From this standpoint, it should be noticed that what is actually written from the performance of dance is its choreographic character. What is selected from the dancing body's varieties are the parameters of its structured movement. And inasmuch as such parameters individuate amidst a milieu of bodily potentials, their recognition and notational inscription must necessarily subtract all that in the dancing body is indivisible. The writing of dance

must go from the body's continuous infinity of potentials to the finite and discontinuous articulation of symbolic notations. In this passage, the notator selects what appears to define the choreographic nexus, leaving aside all the rest. A subtraction of all that is not accessible and of all that does not appear to define the nexus of movements. From which it follows that the choreographic score cannot be but a partial fragment of what moves when a body dances. A fragment that nonetheless implicates potentials for a choreographic principle to be further transduced.

In order to experiment with novel ways of expressing choreographic objects, ways that are both worthy of the dancing body and alternative to traditional modes of choreographic notation, Forsythe set himself to create what would become a landmark in the field of choreographic expression, mostly due to its use of new media. The interactive CD-ROM *"Improvisation Technologies: A Tool for the Analytical Dance Eye"* (2012), created together with dancer Nik Haffner, media artists Volker Kuchelmeister and Christian Ziegler, and first published by Karlsruhe's Center for Art and Media Technology (ZKM) in 1999, comprises a collection of objects devised as a toolbox for choreographic creation. Which is to say that these are choreographic objects which can be assembled in a wide range of ways in order to compose ever more complex choreographies. Notably, these are some of the resources that Forsythe used to create choreographic work with the Ballet Frankfurt at that time.[82] A fact that brings to the fore how a choreographic technology such as this one is not neutral with regard to the aesthetics that it allows for. Despite its bias, it is nevertheless remarkable that the publication of *"Improvisation Technologies"* (IT) constituted a turning point in the dissemination of choreographic tools and in the practice of "open source choreography" (Delahunta, 2003). Its use of the multimodal capacities of digital media have influenced to a great extent, not only the publishing of choreographic knowledge, but more fundamentally the very means of its production. An influence that has reached into the development of this study and of all the cases here discussed.[83]

The choreographic objects of this collection (around 60) are expressed in the form of short video recordings over which graphemes are further laid. In each video, one can watch both Forsythe himself explaining the object's parameters and the graphic (animated) notation of their formal results. At once, these objects resonate with the practice of choreographic notation and with the practice of dancing as drawing, a double

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82 This CD-ROM was a follow up of a digital archive of movement material used in the making of performances such as "Loss of Small Detail" (1991) and "Self Meant to Govern" (1994), by the Ballet Frankfurt.

83 For a listing of these projects, see pages 15-19.

connection that is synthesized in the notion of writing, as previously argued.[84] To say that a gesture can be traced by mapping parameters corresponds to saying that it can be written for further use. Correspondingly, what in the case of Forsythe's *IT* is in fact written are less the resulting forms, as traced by the graphemes, than the ideas underlying the dancing body's parametric constraining. In this sense, to move the body according to the idea of, for example, "*Dropping Curves*" (see Illustration 1, below) is less to move it in accordance with a given form than with potentials capable of expressing it. And this is so simply because the diagram of this choreographic object doesn't map this or that specific curved line, but rather the general potential of any dropped curve whatsoever.[85]

In this respect, it is worth noticing that this specific collection of objects results from an analytical approach to dance where movements are geometrically organized. This is an approach that can be traced back to Rudolf von Laban's "kinesphere" (1956), a geometry which depicts the constant limits of the dancing body. Simply described, this is a volume the centre of which is placed over the dancer's centre of gravity and further defined by the multiple points that the body can reach while unchanging its centre. In short, it is a sphere located around the body, at the distance of its centred reach. In contrast to this univocal approach, Forsythe grants the body with the capacity to

Illustration 1: William Forsythe exemplifying the object "Dropping Curves", plus the graphic notation of the curved line, in "Improvisation Technologies'" CD-ROM (Forsythe, 2012).

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84 See page 95.
85 It should be noticed that philosopher Erin Manning, in her recent book "Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance", also discusses the choreographic object "Dropping Curves" in Forsythe's work (2013, p. 77). In contrast to the reference here at stake—the "*Improvisation Technologies'*" collection—, Manning discusses it in the context of her own observations of Forsythe Company's rehearsals. For more on Manning's own take on this choreographic object, see pages 122–124.

displace its centre or even to have multiple centres. Its geometries are mobile and transformative. Not only can the centre of movement migrate throughout the body, but also can its relative geometries be converted into one another, much in the manner of a topological form. In fact, it seems to be more correct to consider Forsythe's analysis of movement in topological terms than in terms of euclidean geometries. After all, inasmuch as the dancing body serves here as a transducer of abstract potentials, it cannot know them but by moving (with) them. Such transductions do not occur when movement just conforms to the reproduction of static figures.

It is perhaps the *IT's* topological character that is better attained with the multimodality of each videogram. If on the one hand each choreographic object is irreducible to danced expressions, verbal explanations and graphemes, on the other hand it is their articulation that offers insights into the object's potentials. This insight, of course, is here enhanced by the fact that these expressive modalities are overlapped onto one another in one same plane of expression. In this way, not only each modality offers insights into the object's parameters, but their relation forms a nexus with the multimodal possibilities of digital articulation. What results from the object's multimodal expression is a relation between nexuses: there is the nexus of each expressive modality and there is the nexus of their articulate relation. The more nexuses are articulated, the better the object that they all express becomes defined. The choreographic object's multimodal expression allows for its parameters to be defined as what remains invariant across the different modalities involved. As mentioned before, this invariant function of choreography corresponds to its principle of individuation, which in turn corresponds to the nexus' relativity to its own absolute origin.[86] Insofar as the nexus' absolute origin is inaccessible, this relativity is nowhere to be found. It is a virtual potential that can only be accessed in effect. Therefore, if the multimodality of each *IT*'s videogram expresses invariant parameters, it is only because it implicates virtual potentials. And it is only by reason of these potentials, which assure each parametric structure's topology, that a nexus is expressed.

Depending on each domain's possibilities of expression, one same choreographic object can appear differently. The parameters possibly depicted from written graphemes are not exactly the same as the depictable in either the object's danced expressions or its verbal explanations. It is only by relating these differences that what they share becomes explicit. In regard to the choreographic object shown above (see Illustration 1), the

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86 See page 97.

following parameters can be depicted: a starting point, a final point and a series of intermediate points connecting the previous two, not in a straight line, but in a descendent arc (the final point being lower than the starting point). This structure can be depicted as well in the dancing body's expressions. But whereas the grapheme doesn't express data with regard to the dancing body, it is with the latter that the object's parameters acquire further definition: all the points of the descendent arc coincide with one single bodily point—in this case, the right hand. Despite its appearance, this is not a simple parameter. For here it is implied that, while the hand follows the descendent arc, there occurs a progressive structuration throughout the rest of the body, which organizes its movements with spiralling forms. This is somewhat inevitable, since spiralling is the organizational tendency of the musculoskeletal system in movement. In this sense, the descendent arc, rather than being given, emerges when the dancing body follows the given parameters, determining in this way the arc's amplitude and length. From this organizational tendency follows a final parameter, which is made explicit with the videogram's multimodal nexus: the arc's final point corresponds to the place where the body's spiralling movement can no longer progress (i.e. most probably the floor). It is the multimodal nexus that defines most clearly the object's parameters. What is not expressed with one modality can be made explicit with others. And their relation in continuity can definitely express what remains without variation.

If what is transduced across choreography's variable recurrences are principles of individuation, it remains to be explained how this transduction occurs. Or, better yet, it remains to be said how choreographic principles are preserved throughout a process of cross-domain transduction. This is clearly a problem of memory. It regards the problem of how choreographic memory moves through the actual-virtual dynamisms of process. In order to tackle this problematic, it is perhaps useful to draw upon philosopher Gilles Deleuze's theory of memory, since his distinction between "transcendental memory" and "empirical memory" can facilitate the understanding that, between the choreographic object's parametric structure and its virtual potentials, there exists a process which fluctuates between perception, forgetting and remembering. For Deleuze, "[e]mpirical memory is addressed to those things which can and even must be grasped: what is recalled must have been seen, heard, imagined or thought. That which is forgotten, in the empirical sense, is that which cannot be grasped a second time by the memory which searches for it (it is too far removed; forgetting has effaced or separated us from the memory). Transcendental memory, by contrast, grasps that which from the outset can only be recalled, even the first time: not a contingent past, but the being of

the past as such and the past of every time. In this manner, the forgotten thing appears in person to the memory which essentially apprehends it." (1994, p. 140). In a sense, this notion of transcendental memory corresponds to the general potentials without which no actualization can ever occur. Only because the potentials of abstraction are in fact the objects of transcendental memory, can these ingress into particular forms. In contrast, empirical memory is always relative to the objects of perception. What is given in perception will become a referent for recognition and prediction. Which implies that the potentials of the one and the potentials of the other affect one another in the same way that the virtual and the actual do. In fact, transcendental memory and empirical memory are just alternative designations for the virtual and for the actual, respectively. Individuation is conditioned both by what is determinately given—empirical memory as the actuality of what has already individuated and got to be inscribed in the experience of the world—and by the indetermination of an initial disparity, which in a sense equates the absolute origin of individuation with the potentials of transcendental memory.

From this standpoint, it can be posited that, in regard to choreographic objects, not only the virtual dimension of transcendental memory assures the necessary potentials for them to be created anew, as it assures the capacity for what has been empirically given to be reactualized in a novel manner. This creative capacity of transcendental memory is what allows for the recurrences of choreography to differ from one another. It assures degrees of indetermination necessary for differences to take place. But it is also what allows for recurrence itself, even when what was once perceived has been forgotten. It is this capacity of the virtual to retain the forgotten that allows for similar resolutions to occur in processes that have no relationship whatsoever with one another. Transcendental memory allows for the inexplicable coincidence of unrelated events. And despite the recollection of what has been forgotten being said by Deleuze to "appear in person to the memory which essentially apprehends it", this should not be understood as a corresponding to a conception of transcendental memory as essence, i.e. as an essential trait capable of defining seamlessly its own different expressions. In contrast to any kind of idealism, the objects of transcendental memory should be understood as virtual potentials that, because they tend towards possibility with probabilistic distributions that favour some events in detriment of others, are in themselves fields of intensive differentiation. The objects of transcendental memory are diagrammatic in both the sense that they are real but imperceptible and in the sense that they can be so problematic that their resolution actually defines determinate

expressions. The fact that one same diagram allows for the emergence of different expressions (as different as dancing, speaking and writing) can thus be said to result from a differentiation of tendencies that depends on its relation with actual conditions of individuation. Depending on the domain of individuation and on its possibilities of expression, the diagrammatic forces of abstraction will be differently expressed. If the domain is the dancing body, the expression of a choreographic diagram's will conform to its possibilities. Conversely, there are choreographic objects that are beyond the expressive possibilities of the dancing body.[87] If the domain is the kind of graphical writing that, at the time of the *IT*'s release, was available to be used with video recordings, then the choreographic diagram will conform to the possibilities offered by the technical devices in use. Insofar as each domain limits virtual potentials with determinate possibilities, each diagram can be expressed differently. Which is not to say that several recurrences of one same diagram in one same domain will, in contrast, be expressed similarly. This depends much on the domain's degree of indetermination. The dancing body, for example, implicates such a degree of indetermination that it will never express one same diagram the same way twice.

Arguing that indetermination is precisely what both idealism and realism fail to acknowledge in relation to the necessary conditions of individuation, dance and media theorist Stamatia Portanova argues in her book "Moving without a Body: Digital Philosophy and Choreographic Thoughts" (2013) that in both perspectives "[t]he fundamental question that remains unanswered is how to explain difference and repetition, what persists and what mutates in the form of a step, or how to preserve immanent patterns of being and becoming, of nature and reason, in dance." (Ibid., p. 66). Both from the perspective that repetition is transcendentally determined and from the perspective that repetition follows from physical laws, the fact that difference occurs, even when identity and similitude seem to prevail, is largely neglected. Both views override the indetermination of potentials, only to posit an identitary mode of causality at the heart of process. If this would be so in the case of choreography, neither could the perception of dance be forgotten nor could its remembrance be expressed with a difference. For Portanova, choreography has always been "afflicted by an essential

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87 It is enough to recall that choreographer Merce Cunningham used such strategy to challenge the dancers with whom he worked. It is well known that "the first choreographer of international renown who routinely utilized the computer as a choreographic tool" (Copeland, 2004, p. 168) used the choreographic software "*LifeForms*" (www.charactermotion.com) to generate improbable and even impossible images of movement that the dancers would then try to execute. Importantly, these computer generated images were not intended to be reproduced as such, but rather to act as catalysts for the dancers to discover new ways of moving.

form of forgetting" (Ibid. p. 65), which accords with the already mentioned excess of the body over writing. Forgetting, in this sense, corresponds to the definition of performance as that which is transient and irretrievable. But, beyond this, it corresponds as well to the non-actualized potentials of movement. A potentiality that, for Portanova, constitutes the very heart of a movement that is not a repetitive mode of differentiation, i.e. repetition without difference, but rather a differentiating mode of repetition, i.e. repetition with difference. In her words: "one step is always in relation not only to the following one, but to a multiplicity of potential steps not actually taken. It is this particular relation of the step to its intensive potential that constitutes movement's rhythm: the in-between of movement continuously folding into a centrifugal vortex or a spiral. Impossible to repeat." (Ibid. p. 65). It is the immanence between virtual potentials and actual constraints that not only allows for the virtualization of actuality but also for the continuous, i.e. rhythmic, relation of what would otherwise be discontinuous (because perceived as such). The rhythmic character of repetition attests the return of difference within individuation. "It is the difference that is rhythmic", say Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, "not the repetition, which nevertheless produces it: productive repetition has nothing to do with reproductive meter" (1987, p. 314).

The differentiation of repetition corresponds precisely to what has been here designated as encounter. In Portanova's words: "Every time a remarkable or distinctive point of a body (for example, the ankle as an abstract point of the notation's score) combines with, or relates to, that of another body (for example, the dancer's ankle as a concrete anatomical point), a difference is generated: from one gesture to the other, difference is carried not alongside imitation but throughout a progressive repetition of singularities" (2013, p. 67). Novelty is not added to the repetition of the same. Rather, it is rhythm itself, with its differential character, that follows from the combination of implicit potentials with explicit forms. Such is the diagrammatic capacity of repetition. The problematic difference between all the possible curves that a dancing body can express when combining itself with the object "*Dropping Curves*" corresponds in this way to a difference between potentials that is immanent in the object's possible expressions. To remember the object in a certain way is to differ from what is given and therefore already known. It is to individuate novel instances of knowledge and, correspondingly, novel relations between subjects and objects. Which is also the reason why, for Portanova, the rhythmic repetition of a diagrammatic combination between formal and formless potentials corresponds to memory itself. Or, in her own words, this combination is "what makes of the repeating body a remembering mind". As such,

"[r]ather than being physically contingent and external to the abstract concept, or rather than being conceptually programmed and external to the physical body, the difference of a dance form becomes internal to an idea". (Ibid.). A corollary from which it follows that the choreographic diagram is in itself an idea of dance. And insofar as an idea is neither fully removed from actuality nor fully disconnected from what is, the choreographic object can be said to be an idea of movements with nexus. It is a dynamic whole primarily defined by the creative relation between its general and relative potentials. A whole that can be reduced neither to pure abstractions nor to pure expressions, but which is a topology with the capacity of expressing itself differently without ceasing to be itself.

In order to pursue such understanding of choreographic objects, this study will now turn towards the notion that ideas are fundamentally topological and that, as such, they structure the immanent relation between abstractions and expressions. Both in regard to the notion of diagram and in regard to the movements of choreographic thought, it should now be asked: How does rhythm partake the complex interplay between the unconscious, the intelligible and the sensible? And, moreover, how does this interplay acquire a truly choreographic character? What seems to be most evident is that, in any case, a multiplicity of movements must connect the abstract with the concrete according to its own nexus. But how this nexus manifests itself and endures throughout the rhythmic affectivity of all dimensions of movement's wholeness remains to be clarified.